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I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 30, 2011, Anwar Al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen and Mus-
lim cleric residing in Yemen, was killed by a C.I.A.-led U.S. drone 
strike.1  Al-Awlaki had been linked to Nidal Malik Hassan, the Fort 
Hood shooter, as well as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the man 
charged with the attempted Christmas 2009 bombing.2  Al-Awlaki was 
alleged to be affiliated with a Yemeni branch of Al-Qaeda 3 
The notion that individuals can be targeted for death is not new.  
Indeed, the United States has been using drone missile strikes as part 
of the Global War on Terror for years.4  The use of targeted killing 
has received increased attention in recent months due to the success-
ful killing of Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011.5  The successful bin 
Laden mission led to increased efforts on the part of the Obama ad-
ministration to kill Al-Awlaki.6 
Although targeted killing has become somewhat commonplace, 
the idea that a U.S. citizen could be targeted for death has incited 
criticism and concern from many constitutional theorists.  Former 
CIA attorney Vicki Divoll notes the irony that the executive branch 
can target a citizen for death unilaterally, but would have to get per-
mission from the judicial branch in order to listen in on his phone 
 
  Student, University of Pennsylvania Law School, J.D. expected 2012.  I would like to thank 
Professor Kermit Roosevelt for providing guidance and helpful advice in this discussion. 
 1 Jennifer Griffin & Justin Fishel, Two U.S.-Born Terrorists Killed in CIA-Led Drone Strike, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/09/30/us-born-
terror-boss-anwar-al-awlaki-killed/. 
 2 Vicki Divoll, Will We Kill One of Our Own?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010 at A1. 
 3 Scott Shane, A Legal Debate As C.I.A. Stalks A U.S. Jihadist, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2010, at A1. 
 4 Id.; see also Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Ter-
rorists, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 406 (2009) (describing the use of “predator drones” in 
the war on terror). 
 5 Peter Baker et al., Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2011 at A1. 
 6 Al-Awlaki Targeted by U.S. Military Drone in Yemen, CNN.COM (May 6, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-06/world/yemen.drone.strike_1_awlaki-al-awlaki-al-
qaeda-members?_s=PM:WORLD. 
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calls.7  Many assert that the fate of a U.S. citizen should not rest solely 
in the hands of the executive branch, and that some kind of process 
should be implemented to satisfy the due process demands of the 
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.8 
In early 2010, Nasser Al-Awlaki, Anwar Al-Awlaki’s father, filed suit 
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to en-
join the U.S. government from carrying out the targeted killing of his 
son.9  The court denied his motion, on the grounds that Nasser Al-
Awlaki lacked standing and that the question was a “political ques-
tion” that was inappropriate for judges to address.10  The court did 
not reach the merits of the constitutional claims. 
This Comment seeks to analyze and address the constitutional is-
sues that arise from the U.S. government’s efforts to target a U.S. citi-
zen for death.  In doing so, I hope to address many of the issues that 
the district court failed to reach.  I will argue that while the executive 
does have the authority to target an individual for death, such a deci-
sion should be subject to review in a hearing before an Article III 
judge before the killing is carried out. 
My analysis will be twofold.  First, I will analyze whether the execu-
tive branch has authority to target an individual for death, and if so, 
under what circumstances such an action is authorized.  I will com-
pare and contrast the idea of targeted killing within the context of 
criminal law and the law of war, and try to determine what (if either) 
framework best applies to the situation faced by a U.S. citizen alleged-
ly engaged in terrorist activity.  I will analyze what role the Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force might play in determining whether tar-
geted killing is ever authorized.  Given these considerations, I will 
propose that targeted killing should be authorized only in limited 
circumstances, namely where it is the only feasible way to prevent the 
individual from engaging in terrorist activity, and other means (such 
as capture) have been exhausted or would be impossible. 
Second, I will address the due process concerns raised by the no-
tion of targeted killing.  Even in circumstances where the executive 
has authority to target a citizen for death, that citizen is still entitled 
to the due process guarantees of the U.S. Constitution.  I will address 
various arguments regarding what process (if any) should be due a 
citizen targeted for death.  In doing so, I will be cognizant of the 
 
 7 See Divoll, supra note 2. 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 9 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469 (JDB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129601, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 
7, 2010). 
 10 Id. at *6–7. 
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practical concerns that underlie this discussion.  After considering 
conflicting ideas and concerns, I will propose the executive’s decision 
to target a citizen for death should be reviewed in a private hearing 
before an Article III judge before the killing is carried out. 
This article will address constitutional concerns by referring to “an 
individual in Al-Awlaki’s position.”  This phrase refers to a U.S. citizen 
residing outside of the U.S. allegedly engaging in terrorist activity 
who has been targeted for death by the U.S. government.  This article 
will analyze whether the killing of Al-Awlaki was constitutional, and 
will suggest ways in which the executive branch can comply with con-
stitutional demands in the future. 
II.  EXECUTIVE POWER 
 The threshold question in determining whether (or when) a citi-
zen can legally be targeted for death is determining when, if ever, the 
executive has authority to use targeted killing.  This inquiry depends 
in part on whether the framework of criminal law or the law of war 
applies.  To provide some background for this discussion, I will first 
provide a brief summary of the history of U.S. assassination policy.  I 
will then explore whether targeted killing is permissible under the 
authority of criminal law and the law of war. 
A. History of U.S. Assassination Policy 
The U.S. government has yet to explicitly address the legality of 
targeted killing as it is used in the War on Terror.  However, the U.S. 
government has previously addressed the legality of assassinations 
during peacetime.  In the 1970s, the Church Committee’s investiga-
tion regarding the use of assassination gave rise to the inference that 
the CIA had viewed this as a viable option.11 The investigation focused 
on past attempted assassinations of government leaders such as Fidel 
Castro and Rafael Trujillo.12  The committee concluded that Castro 
and Trujillo (among others) were in fact the targets of CIA assassina-
tion plots.13  As a result of the committee’s investigation (and the me-
 
 11 See David Ennis, Comment, Preemption, Assassination, and the War on Terrorism, 27 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 253, 265 (2005) (discussing assassination plots by the CIA). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 265–66. 
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dia backlash that resulted),14 in 1976, President Ford signed executive 
order15 11,905 which prohibited “political” assassinations.16 
Despite the ban on political assassinations, it is unlikely that this 
policy would govern targeted killings as they are used in the War on 
Terror.  It is generally understood that the American policy against 
assassination only applies during peacetime.17  The Church Commit-
tee’s proposed legislation supported the conclusion that the anti-
assassination policy did not apply during times of war.18  Moreover, 
the bar on assassination only went as far as the scope of the Church 
Committee’s investigation, which focused on assassination plots dur-
ing peacetime.19  Because of this, it is unlikely that the policy is appli-
cable to the War on Terror.20  President Bush has asserted that this 
policy does not apply in the context of the War on Terror.21  Follow-
ing from this assertion, the CIA has employed lethal missile strikes 
against suspected Al-Qaeda leaders.22 
The use of drone strikes against Al-Qaeda does not mark the first 
time the United States has engaged in targeted killing during war-
time.  During World War II, President Roosevelt authorized a mission 
to shoot down Japanese General Yamamoto’s plane after learning of 
his flight plans.23  Thus, while precedent exists for targeting individu-
als for death during wartime, the problem is complicated in the con-
text of the War on Terror.  Unlike Yamasoto, Al-Awlaki is not a un-
 
 14 See id. at 264 (discussing the media coverage of the Church committee’s findings and the 
public outcry that resulted). 
 15 Although President Ford suggested that Congress pass a law criminalizing assassination, 
Congress failed to do so.  See id. at 269 (“The Church Committee’s recommendation to 
Congress to enact a statute criminalizing assassination was ultimately dismissed and no 
law has since been created that even addresses the issue.”).  However, Ford’s executive 
order banning assassination was followed by both the Carter and Reagan administrations, 
which renewed the order.  Id. at 261–62. 
 16 Id. at 261. 
 17 Id. at 269 (“Given the history behind Ford’s Executive Order 11,905, it would be reasona-
ble to conclude that the assassination prohibition only applies during peacetime.”). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 270. 
 21 Id. at 263. 
 22 See Stephen Knoepfler, Note, Dead or Alive:  The Future of U.S. Assassination Policy Under a 
Just War Tradition, 5 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 457, 458 (2010) (examining the legitimacy of 
some assassinations under just war theory).  It should be noted, however, that these 
strikes are inherently different from the targeted killing attempt on Al-Awlaki, as the 
strikes that have already been employed have been made amidst active combat.  See 
Shane, supra note 3, at A1 (commenting that Mr. Al-Awlaki is located “far from [the] hos-
tilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan”). 
 23 Yamamoto Isoroku (1884–1943), THE PACIFIC WAR ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at 
http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/Y/a/Yamamoto_Isoroku.htm (last visited June 26, 2011). 
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iformed enemy soldier, and the War on Terror is not a traditional 
war.24  Thus, the issue of targeted killing is complicated by the un-
usual nature of the War on Terror.  Because the War on Terror is not 
a traditional war, I will analyze how targeted killing would be viewed 
under a criminal law framework and under a law of war framework, 
and then assess which (if either) should apply. 
B. Criminal Law and the Law of War 
Under the authority of criminal law, the government’s ability to 
use deadly force is quite limited.  Ostensibly, the Obama Administra-
tion seeks to employ targeted killing in order to prevent the person 
targeted from engaging in future terrorist activity.  Under Tennessee v. 
Garner, such preventive killing is impermissible except where there is 
probable cause to believe that the suspect is dangerous to others.25  
Under U.S. criminal law, the use of deadly force without the threat of 
imminent danger is impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. 
The Court further clarified the standard for the use of deadly 
force in Scott v. Harris.26  There, the Court observed that the Garner 
test for when deadly force is permissible is an objective reasonable-
ness test that is not meant to be applied rigidly.27  The Court found 
there that the officer’s use of deadly force was reasonable when he 
bumped the defendant’s speeding car, noting that the defendant’s 
actions posed an “actual and imminent” danger.28  In determining 
whether deadly force was warranted, the Court noted that it was not 
only necessary to consider the number of lives at risk, but also the 
relative culpabilities of the parties.29  Because the defendant had 
created the risk, the Court found that it was reasonable for the officer 
to prevent him from harming innocent bystanders.30  Thus, if an indi-
vidual targeted for death is in fact engaging in terrorist plots, the Scott 
v. Harris analysis suggests that the use of deadly force is warranted, 
 
 
24  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2066 (2005) (observing that “some commentators have suggested 
that the conflict with al Qaeda does not qualify as a ‘real’ war”). 
 25 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (holding that deadly force is only allowed to 
apprehend felons who the police had probable cause to believe were dangerous to them 
or the public). 
 26 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 384 (“[I]t is clear from the videotape that respondent posed an actual and immi-
nent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian 
motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.”). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
306 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
since a number of innocent lives are at stake and the target is respon-
sible for that risk. 
However, Garner also requires that the threat must be “imminent.”  
Lower courts have clarified this by observing that courts will consider 
“whether the officers were in danger at the precise moment that they 
used force” in evaluating whether the use of deadly force was reason-
able.31  This imminence standard is problematic in the context of tar-
geted killing for a number of reasons.  First, the government may not 
have sufficient intelligence to know when a possible attack might take 
place.  Second, even if they had information regarding a possible at-
tack, the timeframe is much different than most cases that discuss the 
use of deadly force, since most cases focus on a situation that takes 
place in a matter of seconds.  Finally, Al-Awlaki’s situation in particu-
lar is problematic because he was not necessarily the person who was 
conducting (or even planning) the attack; rather, he posed a threat 
primarily because of the violent rhetoric he allegedly espoused.  Con-
sidering the fact that it would be tremendously difficult to establish 
the “imminence” factor in the context of targeted killing, the crimi-
nal law framework (if applied) would not permit targeted killing in 
most situations.32 
The law of war framework, if applied, would provide at least 
broader authority to use targeted killing than would the criminal law 
framework.  Under the law of war, the executive is permitted to kill 
enemy soldiers, even as a preventive measure.33  As long as the attack 
is on a legitimate military target and treacherous means34 are not 
used, the use of targeted killing is permissible.35  Civilians, however, 
cannot be attacked unless they are actively participating in the hostili-
ties.36  This suggests that under a traditional war framework, targeted 
 
 31 Philips v. James, 422 F.3d 1075, 1083 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 32 But see William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination:  The 
U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 682–85 (2003) (arguing that U.S. criminal 
law does not bar the use of targeted killing abroad). 
 33 See Ennis, supra note 11, at 256–57 (noting that targeted killing is legal in the context of 
war as long as treacherous means are not employed). 
 34 Ennis notes that the following actions may be considered as “treacherous” means:  
(1) a treacherous killing of a specifically targeted person is an assassination; (2) 
falsely inducing the victim into believing he is safe will likely be treachery; (3) the 
victim’s status as a non-combatant does not lessen the treacherous quality of the 
killing; (4) the disproportionateness and the lack of necessity surrounding the tar-
geted act of killing has some bearing on whether it is treacherous. 
  Id. at 257. 
 35 Murphy & Radsan, supra note 4, at 418 (observing that the law of war only ban targeted 
killing where the target is “tricked” into “thinking that he is safe”). 
 36 Id. 
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killing is permissible as applied to legitimate military targets.37  But 
this distinction increases the lack of clarity as applied to the War on 
Terror.  For example, it would be difficult to decisively say whether or 
not an individual like Al-Awlaki should be considered a legitimate 
military target or a civilian.38  Because Al-Awlaki was not clearly a legi-
timate military target, it was questionable whether he could be tar-
geted for death even under the law of war framework. 
Despite this lack of clarity, the law of war undoubtedly provide at 
least broader support for the use of targeted killing.  Under the au-
thority of criminal law, targeted killing is impermissible absent an 
imminent threat.  Under the law of war, targeted killing is permissible 
but only as against legitimate military targets. 
Complications arise in determining whether the criminal law 
framework or the law of war framework should even apply to the situ-
ation before us, since the War on Terror is not a traditional war.  
Some factors lean in favor of applying the criminal law framework.  
For example, the enemy’s identity as a “nonstate actor” implies that 
the criminal framework should apply.39  However, several other con-
siderations lean in favor of applying the traditional war framework.  
The wrongdoing is performed by someone outside of the relevant ju-
risdiction (here, the United States) as a challenge to the right of the 
United States to exist.  Al-Qaeda has declared war against the United 
States, and has attacked U.S. military facilities.40  The U.S. Congress 
and President have always treated the War on Terror as a war.41  
Moreover, the “scale” of the wrongdoing at stake is quite severe.  
Surely terrorist attacks that aim to kill thousands are more “severe” 
than most wrongs sought to be redressed by traditional criminal law.42 
 
 37 See, e.g., Knoepfler, supra note 22, at 487–88 (concluding that targeted killing is permissi-
ble within the context of war). 
 38 See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 4, at 419 (noting the difficulties of determining whether 
terrorists should be classified as “civilians” or legitimate military targets). 
 39 See Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 459–61 
(2002) (noting that the crucial factors in determining whether the war or crime frame-
work should apply are the identity of the actor, the jurisdictional province of the wrong-
doing, the scale of the crime, and the intent of the actor). 
 40 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terror, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2068 (2005). 
 41 See id. at 2070 (“When, as here, both political branches have treated a conflict as a ‘war,’ 
and that characterization is plausible, there is no basis for the courts to second-guess that 
determination based on some metaphysical conception of the true meaning of war.”). 
 42 See id. at 2068 (“The scale and organized nature of the September 11 attacks and the 
scope of their destruction in terms of lives, economic loss, and psychological trauma also 
transcend what is typical of mere criminal action.”); see also Charles I. Lugosi, Rule of Law 
or Rule By Law:  The Detention of Yaser Hamdi, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 225, 227 (2003) (arguing 
that the key factors in determining whether criminal law or the law of war should apply 
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These factors suggest that the framework of war should apply to the 
War on Terror.43 
But the War on Terror differs from “traditional” wars in many 
other crucial ways.  The enemy intermingles with civilians and attacks 
both civilian and military targets, and the geographic location of the 
“battlefield” is indeterminate.44  While in a traditional war opposing 
forces wear “distinct uniforms, carry their arms openly, and comply 
with the law of war,” none of these conventions are followed in the 
War on Terror.45  The opposing forces in the War on Terror wear no 
distinct emblem that would afford them legal “combatant” status un-
der the law of war.46  These factors suggest that the “traditional war” 
framework would be problematic as applied to the War on Terror. 
Despite these differences, some argue that targeted killing is an 
appropriate use of force in the War on Terror.  For example, at the 
outset of the War on Terror, President Bush suggested that assassina-
tion may be a viable option in preventing future terrorist attacks.47  
This assertion was based on his preemption strategy, which recog-
nized that “traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a 
terrorist enemy.”48  Bush concluded that the U.S. must adapt its ap-
proach in dealing with the new terrorist enemy, and assassination 
may be a necessary tool in preempting future attacks.49 
The idiosyncrasies of the War on Terror have perplexed constitu-
tional theorists, who have proposed numerous solutions.  Feldman 
argues that neither the criminal law framework nor the law of war 
framework should exclusively apply, but rather the framework must 
 
are “the selected target, the nature, identity and number of the victims, the psychological 
impact, the political motivation of the enemy, the scale of the attacks, and the magnitude 
of the resulting devastation”). 
 43 See Feldman, supra note 39, at 459–61 (discussing the elements of the crime/war distinc-
tion). 
 44 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 40, at 2048–49 (questioning the applicability of the 
traditional wartime framework to the Global War on Terror).  But see Ennis, supra note 
11, at 271 (concluding that the war on terrorism is undoubtedly a war in the traditional 
sense). 
 45 Tung Yin, Procedural Due Process to Determine “Enemy Combatant” Status in the War on Terror-
ism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351, 352 (2006); see also Lugosi, supra note 41, at 226 (noting that 
the enemy in GWOT ignores the conventional laws of warfare). 
 46 See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 4, at 419 (“[M]any terrorists function as combatants, but 
they do not satisfy the requirements—such as wearing a recognizable emblem—for legal 
‘combatant’ status and for the various burdens and privileges that come with that sta-
tus.”). 
 47 See Ennis, supra note 11, at 254 (discussing President Bush’s doctrine for the War on Ter-
ror). 
 48 Id. at 253. 
 49 Id. at 254. 
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be reexamined altogether.50  Bradley and Goldsmith suggest that, giv-
en the lack of clarity, the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) should be controlling.51 
Indeed, Bradley and Goldsmith’s approach is most consistent with 
the approach traditionally taken by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Because 
the War on Terror neither falls directly into the category of “criminal 
law” nor “traditional war,” the executive’s authority to use targeted 
killing is unclear.  Youngstown suggests that when the executive’s au-
thority is unclear, the executive should obtain congressional authori-
zation for his action to be valid.52  Because Congress may have autho-
rized the executive’s use of targeted killing when it passed the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), it is essential to ex-
plore whether this provides the executive with authority to go forward 
with targeted killing. 
C. Under AUMF, The Executive May Target an Individual for Death if it is 
the Only Way to Prevent the Individual from Engaging in Terrorist 
Activity 
In passing the AUMF, Congress authorized the President to  
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or har-
bored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts 
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, or-
ganizations or persons.53  
President Obama has claimed that this gives him authority to use mil-
itary force all over the world against Al-Qaeda.54  The language of 
AUMF is subject to a broad interpretation.  As the Hamdi Court 
 
 50 See Feldman, supra note 39, at 458 (“The general suggestion of the Essay is that it may not 
be necessary to choose either crime or war as an exclusive general framework for address-
ing problems of international terror.  Rather, the framework itself may require reexami-
nation—a reexamination perhaps long overdue, but in any case prompted in the United 
States by the events of September 11.”). 
 51 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 40, at 2050 (noting that the “Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (AUMF) deserves to be a more central part of the analysis of the war on 
terrorism”). 
 52 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own 
right plus all that Congress can delegate.”). 
 53 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001). 
 54 Eli Lake, Yemeni Gains Civil Liberties Backing; Dad Wants Him off U.S. Hit List, WASH. TIMES, 
Aug. 4, 2010, at A1. 
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noted, AUMF did not use the specific language of detention.55  Be-
cause the means used by the President are not contemplated, killing 
may be authorized if it is necessary and appropriate.56  Thus, it is es-
sential to determine when, if ever, the targeted killing of a U.S. citi-
zen outside of a war zone would be necessary and appropriate.57 
Although it has never been determined whether or not AUMF au-
thorizes targeted killing, there is significant support for a broad read-
ing of AUMF.58  AUMF provides no limits on the means that the Pres-
ident can employ.59  Bradley and Goldsmith note that past executive 
branch practice largely informs the determination of whether any 
particular action taken by the executive branch is authorized by 
AUMF.60  As a result, a Court would more likely find the use of tar-
geted killing permissible if there was a longstanding practice of the 
executive branch using this method in wartime.  Indeed, as previously 
mentioned, the executive branch has used targeted killing through 
the use of predator strikes in the War on Terror.  This provides sup-
port for the notion that AUMF authorizes at least some use of tar-
geted killing. 
The U.S. citizenship of the individual does not limit the authority 
of the executive.  The Court clearly stated in Ex Parte Quirin that a 
U.S. citizen is subject to the law of war when he takes up arms against 
the United States.61  The Court reaffirmed this proposition in Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, in which the Court addressed the scope of the President’s 
 
 55 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004). 
 56 See Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 32, at 736 (suggesting that AUMF may authorize 
the use of targeted killing, since the means are left to the discretion of the executive). 
 57 A crucial point should be noted here:  By its terms, AUMF only authorizes the use of mili-
tary force against those who were somehow connected to the September 11, 2001 attacks.  
Id. at 737.  Because it is not alleged that Anwar Al-Awlaki was in any way involved with 
those particular attacks, AUMF by its terms does not apply to the targeted killing of him 
specifically.  However, Al-Awlaki is merely used as a case study for purposes of this Com-
ment.  Indeed, this Comment is meant to address the broader issue of when a U.S. citizen 
may be targeted for death by the executive branch.  Thus, I will continue to explore the 
applicability of AUMF as it may apply in certain situations. 
 58 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 40, at 2080-82 (arguing that Congress intended for 
AUMF to confer broad authority to the President). 
 59 Id. at 2080 (“[T]he AUMF does not appear to impose any limitation on either the re-
sources or the methods that the President can employ.  Instead, the AUMF broadly au-
thorizes the President to use ‘all necessary and appropriate force’ to prosecute the war.”). 
 60 Id. at 2085 (observing that the Hamdi Court focused on the past executive branch prac-
tice of detaining enemy combatants in assessing whether or not the practice was autho-
rized by AUMF). 
 61 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942) (“Citizenship in the United States of an enemy bel-
ligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful 
because in violation of the law of war.”). 
Oct. 2011] TRIAL BY SNIPER 311 
 
authority under AUMF.62  In Hamdi, the Court dealt with the issue of 
whether the executive branch was authorized under AUMF to detain 
a U.S. citizen captured on the battlefield and, if so, what process was 
due him.63  The Court held that pursuant to AUMF, the executive 
could detain the citizen, but that the citizen was entitled to notice, a 
fair opportunity to rebut the assertions against him, and a neutral de-
cisionmaker.64 
Because a targeted individual’s citizenship in itself poses no bar-
rier to the use of targeted killing and because AUMF should be read 
broadly, it appears that targeted killing may be used against a U.S. cit-
izen in at least some circumstances.  However, complications arise 
from the fact that Al-Awlaki was not engaged in “active combat,” and 
was in fact located far away from any specified war zone.  As noted, 
President Obama has claimed that AUMF permits him to use force 
anywhere in the world, and that he is not confined to any specific bat-
tlefield.65  But the Court’s decision in Hamdi undermines this idea for 
two reasons.  First, the Court found the location of the individual at 
the time of capture to be crucial.  The Court noted that the applica-
tion of AUMF depended in large part on the location of the individ-
ual within a war zone.66  Indeed, the Court distinguished Ex Parte Mil-
ligan67 by asserting that, unlike Milligan (who was detained on U.S. 
soil), Hamdi was detained on the battlefield.68  Because of this differ-
ence, the Court determined that the executive had authority to de-
tain Hamdi. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Court explained why 
this geographic distinction was crucial:  the location of the individual 
indicates whether executive action is necessary to prevent future 
harm to the United States.69  The reasoning in the Court’s decision in 
Hamdi was mainly functional; detention was “necessary and appropri-
 
 62 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 63 Id. at 509. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Lake, supra note 54 (“Mr. Obama, as did his predecessor, President George W. Bush, 
has claimed that a Sept. 14, 2001, resolution of war from Congress authorizes the use of 
military force all over the world against al Qaeda.”); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 
note 40, at 2057 (arguing the AUMF grants extensive powers to the executive). 
 66 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 515–16 (noting that detention of an enemy combatant participating in 
a foreign theater of war is an inherent part of warfare). 
 67 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (holding that the executive branch could not try a citizen detained on 
U.S. soil in a military tribunal when the civilian courts were functioning). 
 68 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 (“Had Milligan been captured while he was assisting Confederate 
Soldiers by carrying a rifle against Union troops on a Confederate battlefield, the holding 
of the Court might well have been different.”). 
 69 Id. at 518. 
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ate” there because it prevented Hamdi from engaging in active com-
bat.70  Because capture and detention was the only way to prevent 
Hamdi from engaging in activity that would harm the United States, 
it was authorized by AUMF.  Such a concern is not necessarily present 
in the case of someone like Al-Awlaki, who is not currently engaged 
in battle.  Thus, the Hamdi Court’s concern about preventing the in-
dividual from engaging in “active combat” is not necessarily present 
here.71 
But this is not the end of the inquiry.  Even if a targeted individual 
is not located on a field of battle, he may still be a threat, and tar-
geted killing may potentially be necessary and appropriate in some 
circumstances.  Applying the reasoning of Hamdi here, a court would 
likely find that the use of targeted killing is only “necessary and ap-
propriate” if it is the only way to prevent someone like Al-Awlaki from 
engaging in terrorist activity or otherwise harming the United States.  
The Hamdi Court was concerned with assuring that the executive 
used the least intrusive means in achieving its objective of preventing 
the enemy combatant from returning to battle.72  The Court made 
clear that the means used to achieve this objective should be no more 
intrusive than necessary.73  It is consistent with the Court’s concern to 
allow targeted killing only when it is the only means available to pre-
vent harm to the United States. 
If the executive can demonstrate that an individual outside of a 
war zone will harm the United States unless he is killed, targeted kill-
ing may be authorized.  This is consistent with Hamdi, in which the 
main concern was preventing future harm to the United States while 
using the least intrusive means available.  This is also consistent with 
U.S. criminal law, in which the executive branch is permitted to kill 
an individual if there is no peaceful means left to apprehend him.74 
Such an approach is also consistent with the approach of the Su-
preme Court.  Even the most stalwart protectors of constitutional 
rights of alleged terrorists recognize that immediate action by the ex-
 
 70 Id. (“The purpose of detention is to prevent captured individuals from returning to the 
field of battle and taking up arms once again.”). 
 71 Id. at 521 (asserting that detention was “necessary and appropriate” because Hamdi was 
detained amidst active combat). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. (explaining that the detainee should be held no longer than the duration of the con-
flict and should not be subject to interrogation). 
 74 See Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 32, at 678 (“[A]s we have seen, even at home in the 
United States, the government may constitutionally use deadly force to prevent a danger-
ous suspect from doing harm to others if no peaceful means is left to apprehend him.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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ecutive is at times necessary to prevent attacks.75  An approach that al-
lows the executive to use deadly force when it is the only available 
means of preventing harm effectively balances the need to protect cit-
izen’s constitutional rights while affording sufficient deference to the 
executive. 
As a final note, even if AUMF does not permit the use of targeted 
killing, it is possible that Congress has nonetheless authorized the 
President to use targeted killing by acquiescence.  Under this line of 
reasoning, because Congress knows about the prior use of assassina-
tion and targeted killing by the CIA and has failed to pass a law spe-
cifically banning its use, Congress has acquiesced to the use of tar-
geted killing.76  However, this argument is problematic in the current 
context.  Although it is alleged that the U.S. government has imple-
mented targeted killing plots against foreign nationals, the use of tar-
geted killing against a U.S. citizen is unprecedented.  Thus, it would 
be difficult to argue that Congress has acquiesced to the use of tar-
geted killing against a U.S. citizen. 
III.  DUE PROCESS 
Even if the executive has the authority to target an individual for 
death, this does not resolve the issue of what is required to satisfy the 
target’s due process rights.  The Hamdi Court recognized that, even 
where the President has authority to take an action under AUMF, the 
citizenship of the individual in question implicates special due 
process concerns.77  Even if the President is authorized to use tar-
geted killing under AUMF, it is essential to determine what process is 
due to a U.S. citizen targeted for death.  After determining that at 
least some procedure is required before an individual is targeted for 
death, I will argue that the executive’s decision to target an individual 
for death must be reviewed by an Article III judge before the killing 
takes place in order to satisfy due process. 
 
 75 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Executive 
detention of subversive citizens, like detention of enemy soldiers to keep them off the 
battlefield, may sometimes be justified to prevent persons from launching or becoming 
missiles of destruction.”). 
 76 See Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 32, at 708. 
 77 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 524 (“Even in cases in which the detention of enemy combatants is 
legally authorized, there remains the question of what process is due to a citizen who dis-
putes his enemy-combatant status.”); see also Yin, supra note 45, at 353 (noting that the 
Court’s determination in Hamdi that the detainee was entitled to procedural protections 
was in large part based on the fact that the detainee was a U.S. citizen). 
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The location of the citizen targeted does not impede his due 
process rights under the Fifth Amendment.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that U.S. citizens living abroad were entitled to the pro-
tections of the Due Process Clause.78  Thus a citizen’s location outside 
of the United States is not determinative in the assessment of his Due 
Process rights. 
The Supreme Court, of course, has yet to address the issue of what 
due process requires for a U.S. citizen who is targeted for death.  In 
Hamdi, the Court addressed the due process requirements for a U.S. 
citizen within the context of detention, and held that the detainee 
was entitled to notice, a fair opportunity to rebut the assertions 
against him, and a neutral decisionmaker.79  Although the reasoning 
in Hamdi is instructive, it is not determinative in the present context.  
Targeted killing raises unique concerns that are not at stake in the 
context of detention.  For example, unlike with detention, targeted 
killing does not allow for the possibility of appeal.80 
Despite the lack of clarity regarding the Court’s approach to tar-
geted killing, I will assess what Due Process may require in that con-
text.  The Court typically employs the Mathews balancing test in de-
termining what procedural rights an individual is entitled to, even in 
cases involving suspected terrorists.81  Thus, I will apply that test here. 
A. Under the Mathews Balancing Test, Some Procedure Is Required Before a 
Citizen Can Be Targeted for Death 
Given the fact that a citizen located outside of the U.S. is pro-
tected by the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, the next inquiry is 
determining what process is due to him.  Applying the Mathews ba-
lancing test82 and considering various critiques by constitutional scho-
lars, I will argue that an individual in Al-Awlaki’s position should be 
entitled to notice by publication and review by a neutral decision-
maker. 
The Court addressed the issue of procedural due process in Ma-
thews v. Eldridge.  There, the Court implemented a “balancing test” for 
 
 78 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). 
 79 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509. 
 80 See Vincent Joel-Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for your Life:  Reflections 
on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 801, 
892 (2005) (discussing the unique due process issues posed by targeted killing). 
 81 See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (introducing use of the Mathews balancing test).  But see 
Yin, supra note 45, at 391–92 (2006) (arguing that the Mathews test is not an appropriate 
test to apply to cases involving terrorism). 
 82 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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determining what process is constitutionally required.83  Under the 
Mathews balancing test, the Court considers the importance of the 
individual’s interest, the importance of the government’s interest, 
and the risk of erroneous deprivation of rights under current proce-
dures.84 
Under the first prong, the individual’s interest must be consi-
dered.  Here, a targeted individual faces a threat to his life interest.  If 
he is in fact killed by orders of the executive branch, this is a depriva-
tion of his life interest, which is explicitly protected by the terms of 
the Fifth Amendment.85  Indeed, this interest is generally recognized 
as being tremendously important.86  Members of the Court have rec-
ognized that the life interest is qualitatively different from the depri-
vation of a lesser liberty interest.87 
The Court has yet to address the issue of how a life interest is to be 
weighed under the Mathews balancing test.  Because most cases apply-
ing Mathews deal with property interests (and occasionally liberty in-
terests), the determination of the value of one’s life is novel.88  The 
Hamdi decision made clear that even an interest in liberty that would 
be deprived as a result of detention is crucially important, and en-
titles an individual to procedural rights.89  Moreover, the Court rec-
ognized that this interest was not affected by the circumstances of 
war.90  Because even a lesser interest (liberty) was considered tre-
mendously important by the Hamdi Court and entitled the detainee 
to procedural protections, it appears that an interest in life would al-
so entitle an individual to at least some procedure. 
Under the second Mathews factor, the government’s interest must 
be considered.  As the Hamdi Court recognized, the government has 
an interest in assuring that enemies do not return to battle.91  Analo-
 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 341–44. 
 85 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 86 Yin argues that because the life interest is so important, Mathews is ill-suited for such de-
terminations because the cost-benefit analysis is better suited for property interests, which 
are quantifiable.  Yin, supra note 45, at 394–95. 
 87 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Because a 
deprivation of liberty is qualitatively different from a deprivation of property, heightened 
procedural safeguards are a hallmark of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.  But 
that jurisprudence has also unequivocally established that a State’s deprivation of a per-
son’s life is also qualitatively different from any lesser intrusion on liberty.”). 
 88 See Yin, supra note 45, at 394–95. 
 89 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529–30 (2004) (observing that the right to be free from 
detention by one’s government is “the most elemental” liberty interest). 
 90 Id. at 530 (“Nor is the weight on this side of the Mathews scale offset by the circumstances 
of war . . . .”). 
 91 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531. 
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gizing to the situation regarding Al-Awlaki, the government has an in-
terest in assuring that Al-Awlaki does not engage in terrorist activity 
that will harm the United States.  The government has a strong inter-
est in preventing terrorist attacks against the United States, and may 
argue that targeted killing is necessary to do this in a timely fashion.92  
The government also has an interest in reducing the process available 
to those individuals that are targeted, because affording those indi-
viduals with procedural protections may lead to the disclosure of state 
secrets.93 
Third, a Court applying the Mathews balancing test must consider 
the risk of erroneous deprivation of rights under existing procedures, 
and whether additional procedures are necessary.94  In the current 
context, this factor is problematic because there is no publicly availa-
ble information regarding what, if any, process the Obama adminis-
tration employs in determining the rights of a targeted individual.  
For present purposes, I will proceed on the assumption that there 
currently exists no process, as I explore what process would be ap-
propriate in light of this absence. 
Finally, the public interest may be considered in assessing what 
process should be due.95  This factor seems to cut both ways.  The 
public certainly has an interest in preventing terrorism.96  Of course, 
the public also has an interest in assuring that citizens are entitled to 
a certain amount of process before they are killed.97 
It is apparent that there are many competing interests at stake.  
Considering the nature of the individual’s interest, a Court would 
likely find that an individual in Al-Awlaki’s position should at least be 
 
 92 See Shane, supra note 3, at A1 (stating the success of drone missile strikes in countering 
terrorism). 
 93 Al-Aulaqi, v. Obama, No. 10-1469 (JDB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129601, at *140 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 7, 2010). 
 94 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976) (“An additional factor to be considered 
here is the fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards.”). 
 95 Id. at 347 (“In striking the appropriate due process balance the final factor to be assessed 
is the public interest.”). 
 96 Shane, supra note 3, at A1 (observing that the failure to target dangerous individuals for 
death may result in devastating terrorist attacks on U.S. soil). 
 97 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004) (“[I]t is equally vital that our calculus not 
give short shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is Amer-
ican citizenship.  It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Na-
tion’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we 
must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.” (ci-
tation omitted)); see also Divoll, supra note 2, at A25 (finding targeted killing by the ex-
ecutive branch to be problematic in light of the values of American citizenship). 
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entitled to some procedural protections.98  In the next section, I will 
analyze which procedural protections should be granted, given the 
practical realities of the situation. 
B. Due Process Requires That a Neutral Decisionmaker Review the Decision of 
the Executive to Target an Individual for Death 
Application of the Mathews balancing test indicates that a citizen 
in Al-Awlaki’s position should be entitled to at least some procedural 
protections.  But there are no guidelines regarding which specific 
protections he should be afforded.  The Court in Hamdi concluded 
that Hamdi should be entitled to a neutral decisionmaker, a fair op-
portunity to rebut the assertions against him, and notice.99  But dif-
ferences in the nature of the situation imply that these and other pro-
tections may not be practicable in the context of targeted killing.  
Indeed, most scholarship and most court decisions related to due 
process in the war on terror relate to detention, not targeted killing.  
While such procedural protections as affording actual notice and 
providing the opportunity to rebut the assertions against him are not 
feasible in the context of targeted killing, a neutral decisionmaker 
should review the executive’s decision to use targeted killing before a 
citizen can be killed. 
1. Although Actual Notice Is Not Feasible, Notice by Publication Is 
Sufficient to Satisfy the Demands of Due Process 
In Hamdi, the Court held that the detainee was entitled to notice 
of the claims against him.100  While it is generally accepted that notice 
is required in the context of an individual contesting his detention,101 
the requirement of actual notice is complicated in the context of tar-
geted killing.102  Justice Thomas’ dissent in Hamdi recognizes the 
problem that notice and opportunity to be heard would pose in such 
a situation.  He observes that it would be ridiculous to require notice 
 
 98 See, e.g., Murphy & Radsan, supra 4, at 444 (asserting that the balance of interests under 
Mathews leans in favor of judicial challenges to targeted killing). 
 99 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. 
100 Id. (emphasizing that due process fundamentally requires that the individual receive no-
tice of the claims against him). 
101 See Yin, supra note 45, at 402 (“Once one establishes that a detainee is entitled to due 
process, it should be uncontroversial to conclude that there must be notice of the reason 
for the person’s detention and a hearing in which the detainee is afforded the opportuni-
ty to challenge that detention.”). 
102 See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 4, at 439 (discussing the problems associated with af-
fording notice and opportunity to be heard to an individual targeted for death). 
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for an individual who is targeted on the battlefield before he is 
killed.103  Other commentators have also recognized that providing 
actual notice for suspected terrorists would be impractical.104  Nation-
al security concerns and state secrets may be compromised by afford-
ing an individual targeted for death with notice of the claims against 
him. 
While actual notice may not be practicable in the context of tar-
geted killing,105 notice by publication should be employed to apprise 
those citizens targeted for death of their rights.  The Supreme Court 
has recognized that notice by publication is sufficient where actual 
notice would not be practical.106  Although there would be no effec-
tive and safe way to personally notify those citizens that they have 
been targeted, the government could easily create a public database 
or website containing the names of those targeted.  This would satisfy 
the notice requirements of due process without endangering U.S. 
forces. 
2. A Jury Trial Is Not Feasible 
Many of the procedural rights associated with a full jury trial have 
been said to be necessary to satisfy due process.  For example, many 
have recognized that access to counsel is a hallmark of due process.107  
Such a right protects against mistakes and prevents the erroneous 
deprivation of a constitutional right.108  Others note that the Sixth 
Amendment109 right to confront witnesses is a fundamental right that 
is typically required by due process.110 
Despite this, affording suspected terrorists a right to a jury trial 
and the right to confront witnesses is problematic.  The few jury trials 
of suspected terrorists in federal court that have occurred have been 
 
103 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 597 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
104 See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 4, at 445 (“The executive, like the courts, cannot prac-
ticably offer suspected terrorists full-blown notice and an opportunity to be heard before 
an attempted targeted killing.”). 
105 Id. at 445–46.  
106 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950). 
107 See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 
465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Access to counsel for the purpose of protecting the 
citizen from official mistakes and mistreatment is the hallmark of due process.”). 
108 Id. 
109 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
110 Amos N. Guiora, Where are Terrorists to Be Tried:  A Comparative Analysis of Rights Granted to 
Suspected Terrorists, 56 CATH. U.L. REV. 805, 805–06 (2007) (posing the question of wheth-
er terrorist defendants should be granted the right to confront witnesses). 
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more like a “circus” than a process.111  Not only are jury trials of sus-
pected terrorists problematic because of public reaction, but such tri-
als also may require the disclosure of intelligence sources.112  Similar-
ly, allowing someone in Al-Awlaki’s position (or an individual 
representing his interests) to have a jury trial would be problematic 
for these same reasons.113  Additionally, affording an individual tar-
geted for death with a full jury trial would be extremely time-
consuming, and may unduly interfere with the executive’s ability to 
prevent terrorism. 
Of course, as noted earlier, another practical problem with pro-
viding any of these rights to an individual targeted for death is that 
such a person is unlikely to come into court himself.  There is a pos-
sibility that another person could represent the interests of the indi-
vidual targeted in court.114  This would alleviate the practical prob-
lems associated with targeted killing while affording procedural pro-
protections. 
However, such a solution is unlikely to solve the problems asso-
ciated with providing a jury trial because courts are hesitant to confer 
standing to individuals seeking to represent the interests of suspected 
terrorists.  Indeed, the District Court in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama held that 
Al-Awlaki’s father did not have next friend standing to represent the 
interests of his son, on the grounds that there is nothing preventing 
Anwar Al-Awlaki himself from appearing before the court.115  The 
Court also rejected Nasser Al-Awlaki’s claim of third party standing, 
on the grounds that Nasser Al-Awlaki did not himself suffer any injury 
in fact.116  Because Courts are unwilling to extend standing to those 
representing the interests of those targeted for death, this poses 
 
111 Id. at 817 (“The proceedings in the Moussaoui trial . . . resembled a circus more than a 
process.”). 
112 See id.; see also Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond Guantanamo, Obstacles and Options, 103 NW. U.L. 
REV. 29, 46–47 (2008) (discussing the difficulties of trying terrorism cases in federal 
courts); Murphy & Radsan, supra note 4, at 441–42 (noting that the litigation process 
would likely compromise classified information). 
113 The District Court grappled with this issue and dismissed the case in part because of the 
potential disclosure of state secrets.  See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469 (JDB), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 129601, at *140–44 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2010). 
114 See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 4, at 440 (suggesting that an appropriate next friend of 
an individual targeted for death could adequately represent the interests of the individual 
targeted). 
115 Al-Aulaqi, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129601, at *29 (“[T]here is nothing preventing him from 
peacefully presenting himself at the U.S. Embassy in Yemen and expressing a desire to 
vindicate his constitutional rights in U.S. courts.”). 
116 Id. at *51 (“Plaintiff cannot show that a parent suffers an injury in fact if his adult child is 
threatened with a future extrajudicial killing.”). 
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another obstacle to providing an individual targeted for death with a 
full jury trial. 
3. A Neutral Decisionmaker Should be Provided to Review the Executive’s 
Decision 
Many procedural protections, such as providing actual notice or a 
jury trial, would raise practical problems in the unique context of tar-
geted killing.  Given these considerations, review by a neutral deci-
sionmaker would ensure that the individual targeted would get some 
kind of process without interfering too heavily on the government’s 
interest in national security. 
Providing suspected terrorists with review by a neutral decision-
maker would help to prevent dissemination of confidential informa-
tion.  After observing the problems associated with providing sus-
pected terrorists with a jury trial, Amos Guiora argues that a bench 
trial would effectively balance the executive’s interest in preserving 
confidential information while also affording the suspects with their 
constitutionally guaranteed procedural rights.117  He notes that a 
bench trial would allow for the introduction of intelligence informa-
tion without fear of compromising such information by presenting it 
before a jury.118 
Similarly, allowing an individual targeted for death to be entitled 
to a neutral decisionmaker would solve the same problems in the 
context of targeted killing as a bench trial would in the context of try-
ing suspected terrorists.  A bench trial would not be sufficient in the 
context of targeted killing, since the target would be unlikely to ap-
pear in court.  Given the exigencies of the situation, a full bench trial 
is unnecessary and time consuming.  A brief proceeding before a 
neutral decisionmaker would alleviate the concerns for timeliness.  A 
neutral decisionmaker could review the executive’s evidence in con-
fidence, thus alleviating concerns about disclosure of confidential in-
formation.  Moreover, because such a proceeding would not be sub-
ject to the procedural requirements of a full trial, the standing 
requirements that prevented Nasser Al-Awlaki from pursuing his 
son’s interests in court would not apply.  Thus, in a hearing before a 
neutral decisonmaker, a friend or representative of the individual 
 
117 See Guiora, supra note 110, at 835 (“It is recommended that trials of individuals suspected 
of involvement in terrorism would be heard before a bench trial, without a jury, to allow 
the introduction of intelligence information that would not be made available to the de-
fendant or counsel.”). 
118 Id. 
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targeted for death could represent his interests without being re-
quired to demonstrate his standing. 
A proceeding before a neutral decisionmaker could follow the 
Hamdi framework, under which there may be a presumption in favor 
of the government and hearsay may be admissible.119  Under this 
framework, if the executive put forth support for its assertion that 
targeted killing was the only feasible means for preventing an indi-
vidual from engaging in terrorist activity, the targeted killing would 
be permissible.  The government should only be required to meet a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.  After reviewing the execu-
tive’s evidence, the decisionmaker would have the final say regarding 
whether the killing is authorized. 
Affording the individual targeted with review by a neutral deci-
sionmaker would effectively balance the competing interests of the 
parties.  From the government’s perspective, this would limit the dis-
closure of confidential information, because only the decisionmaker 
would have access to information, and the proceedings would be kept 
private.  From the target’s perspective, providing review by a neutral 
decisionmaker ensures that the decision is not left solely to the un-
checked discretion of the executive branch.  Providing a neutral deci-
sionmaker also decreases the risk of the erroneous deprivation of a 
life interest.  Allowing a neutral decisionmaker to review the decision 
of the executive would help to reduce errors by catching them and 
ensuring the accuracy of the executive’s decision.120  Indeed, even 
those who assert that an intra-executive process satisfies due process 
in the context of targeted killing emphasize the importance of having 
an impartial decisionmaker review the decision to target an individu-
al for death.121  Providing review by a neutral decisionmaker would ef-
fectively balance the competing interests considered by the Mathews 
test. 
C. The Neutral Decisionmaker Should Be an Article III Judge 
The executive’s decision to target an individual for death should 
be reviewed by an Article III judge before the killing is carried out.  
 
119 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533–34 (2004) (noting that the procedures used in 
reviewing the detention of an enemy combatant could alter the burden of proof and 
hearsay requirements to fit the situation). 
120 See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 4, at 438 (“Independent judges who double-check tar-
geting decisions could catch errors and cause executive officials to avoid making them in 
the first place.”). 
121 Id. at 448 (suggesting that the decisionmaker should be an individual who is subject to 
limited political influence.). 
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The use of an Article III judge as a neutral decisionmaker would legi-
timize the executive’s actions and hold the executive branch accoun-
table during wartime. 
Providing an intra-executive process is not sufficient in the con-
text of targeted killing of a U.S. citizen outside of a war zone.122  Mur-
phy and Radsan argue that due process would be satisfied if, after a 
strike has already occurred, the executive branch launched an inves-
tigation of its legality.123  They argue that interference from the judi-
cial branch would undermine the executive’s decisionmaking and 
compromise state secrets.124 
On the contrary, judicial intervention would not undermine the 
executive’s decisionmaking, but rather would serve to legitimize the 
executive’s actions.  Even during wartime, many are critical of actions 
taken by the executive to deprive individuals of rights without inter-
vention by the judicial branch.  For instance, many objected to the 
Military Commissions Act on the grounds that it did not afford the 
accused of an independent judiciary.125 
Furthermore, as noted above, the concerns about minimizing the 
disclosure of state secrets would be alleviated by permitting only the 
decisionmaker to review the evidence.  The hearing would be con-
ducted privately and the information would be conveyed on a “need-
to-know” basis only.  Thus the confidentiality problems associated 
with affording suspected terrorists a full jury trial are not present in a 
process where the judge reviews the evidence in confidence. 
Not only would judicial intervention decrease public skepticism of 
the executive’s decisions, but would also promote accuracy and fair-
ness.126  Because mistakes are possible (and have happened regarding 
misclassification of terrorists), accuracy is better preserved by allow-
ing the judiciary to check the actions of the executive.127  The process 
 
122 Id.  
123 See id. at 446. 
124 Id. 
125 See Guiora, supra note 110, at 809 (noting that criticism of the Military Commissions Act 
centered on the lack of an independent judiciary). 
126 See Matthew C. Waxman, Guantanamo, Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof:  Viewing the 
Law Through Multiple Lenses, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 245, 260 (2009) (noting that while 
the executive branch is concerned with intelligence collection and interpretation, the 
judicial branch is better able to balance competing values.); see also Murphy & Radsan, su-
pra note 4, at 438 (“Judicial control of targeted killing could increase the accuracy of tar-
get selection, reducing the danger of mistaken or illegal destruction of lives, limbs, and 
property.”). 
127 See, e.g., Gerald E. Rosen, War on Terrorism in the Courts, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & 
ETHICS J. 101, 110 (2006) (observing instances where the executive branch has misclassi-
fied individuals suspected of terrorism). 
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would likely be fairer because federal judges are appointed for life 
tenure, and thus are less likely to be subject to public pressure.128  
Moreover, having a federal judge decide on whether targeted killing 
is permissible would alleviate executive branch pressure.  If a member 
of the executive branch were to be the neutral decisionmaker, he 
would have incentive to permit the President to do whatever he 
deems necessary.  A federal judge would not likely be subject to such 
influence. 
Advocates for judicial deference argue that the executive branch 
should be given extensive authority during wartime, and the judicial 
branch should not interfere with executive decisionmaking.  Justice 
Thomas’ dissent in Hamdi reflects this sentiment.  He argues that al-
lowing process on the battlefield would undermine the executive’s 
authority.129  He asserts that the constitutional structure is based upon 
the notion of a unitary executive with extensive war powers, and that 
this structure would be undermined by judicial interference.130  As a 
result of this structure, he argues that due process merely requires a 
“good-faith executive determination.”131 
Similarly, others argue that the lack of judicial deference during a 
war could disrupt the system of political cooperation in wartime.132  
Under this argument, the executive branch is better suited to interp-
ret laws relating to wartime and foreign affairs.133  As a result, the ex-
ecutive branch is better able to make determinations regarding war-
time issues not only because it has expertise in this area, but also 
because the executive branch is more politically accountable than the 
judicial branch.134  Because the judicial branch lacks expertise in 
these areas, the judicial branch must afford significant deference to 
the executive branch during wartime.135 
These arguments in favor of judicial deference are problematic 
for a number of reasons.  First, permitting the decision to target an 
individual for death to take place solely within the executive branch 
 
128 See Yin, supra note 45, at 404. 
129 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 582 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Court should not interfere with executive decisionmaking in the context of war). 
130 Id. (“[I]t is crucial to recognize that judicial interference in these domains destroys the 
purpose of vesting primary responsibility in a unitary Executive.”). 
131 Id. at 590. 
132 Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld:  The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference 
to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 180 (2006). 
133 Id. at 199 (asserting that the judiciary is ill-suited to resolve issues relating to war because 
they have access to limited information and are “unable to take into account the broader 
factual context” in making decisions). 
134 Id. at 201. 
135 Id. at 200 (noting that federal judges may have little to no expertise in foreign affairs). 
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would strengthen precedent for an unchecked executive in wartime.  
To allow the executive to act without judicial review would legitimize 
a constitutional doctrine whereby the executive would be subject to 
no limitations and would not be constrained by any requirements of 
due process.136  Permitting the judiciary to review decisions made by 
the executive in the context of the war on terror would uphold a con-
stitutional system of checks and balances whereby the executive 
branch is subject to constraints. 
Secondly, even if the argument of “executive expertise” is ac-
cepted, judicial intervention would serve the interests of the public by 
ensuring that the executive does not have a blank check to unilateral-
ly determine who should be killed.137  Even during wartime, it is inap-
propriate to allow the executive branch to act as all three branches of 
government.138  The judicial branch should be involved in cases relat-
ing to terrorism in order to prevent an arbitrary exercise of power by 
the executive.139 
Finally, the Court itself has rejected the notion that the judicial 
branch must defer when the rights of a citizen are involved.  The 
Hamdi Court places great emphasis on the notion that the Courts 
play a key role even in the context of war.140  Given the importance of 
the civil rights and liberties at stake, it would be counterintuitive to 
deprive the courts of their role in such a circumstance.141  Thus, there 
is tremendous support for judicial involvement in the war on terror.  
Judicial intervention would increase the accuracy of the determina-
tion while also giving legitimacy to the executive’s decision and 
upholding civil rights. 
 
136 Id. 
137 See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 4, at 438 (“[J]udicial control of targeted killing could 
serve the interests of all people—targets and non-targets—in blocking the executive from 
exercising an unaccountable, secret power to kill.”). 
138 See Jared Perkins, Note, Habeas Corpus in the War Against Terrorism:  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and 
Citizen Enemy Combatants, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 437, 456 (2005) (arguing that the executive 
branch should not act as all three branches of government). 
139 Id. at 457. 
140 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (“Whatever power the United States Consti-
tution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy or-
ganizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches 
when individual liberties are at stake.”). 
141 See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 127, at 109 (advocating for judicial intervention in the war on 
terror). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The targeted killing of a U.S. citizen presents a novel issue that 
cannot be easily resolved.  While the idea that a U.S. citizen could be 
unilaterally killed by the executive branch is troubling, the new age of 
terrorism presents new challenges to preventing attacks on the Unit-
ed States.  In light of such challenges, the executive branch may need 
to employ new methods in order to prevent attacks, which may in-
clude targeted killing. 
Despite the difficulties in addressing these complicated and con-
flicting concerns, solutions are possible.  Under the framework of 
AUMF, the executive may be able to use targeted killing where it is 
the only practicable means of preventing an attack.  This approach 
allows the executive to fulfill its duty to protect the United States 
while still preserving civil rights where possible.  In addition, due 
process need not be completely sacrificed in the name of national se-
curity.  Providing a citizen targeted for death with review by a neutral 
decisionmaker will reduce errors in decisionmaking by the executive 
and ensure that the decision is justified.  At the same time, this li-
mited protection will not unduly interfere with the executive’s ability 
to respond appropriately to legitimate terror threats.  Although the 
killing of Al-Awlaki raises deep concerns about the due process rights 
of U.S. citizens accused of terrorist behavior, this article suggests that 
the constitutional demands of due process can be met in the future if 
the decision to carry out such a killing is reviewed by a neutral deci-
sionmaker in the judicial branch.     
